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Environmental protection is becoming increasingly arduous for industry
in the European Community ("EC"). For most industries, the cost of
environmental protection is certainly being felt and is frequently begin-
ning to hurt. To determine the reasons for this trend, it is necessary to
look briefly at the evolution of environmental regulation in the EC.
Environmental protection was nowhere mentioned in the Treaty of
Rome, which created the EC. The Single European Act of 1986
("SEA"), which amended the Treaty of Rome, explicitly introduced EC
environmental policy objectives and principles. The constitutional base
for EC environmental legislation provided by the SEA specifies that:
" EC action relating to the environment should be based on pre-
ventative action;
" environmental damage should be rectified at the source;
" the polluter should pay; and
" environmental protection requirements shall be a component of
other EC policies.
The existence of a specific legal base for environmental legislation,
combined with the amendment of the EC treaty to streamline decision-
making on environmental measures, have led to a marked growth in EC
environmental legislation. Increasingly "green" public opinion has also
led to adoption of green policies by mainly political parties, which in turn
have supported the formulation of a strong environmental policy at the
EC level.
The new regulatory policy, introduced by the SEA, has not only led
to a proliferation of EC environmental legislation, but has also influenced
the nature of the environmental measures which the Community is using
to implement this policy. One of the most marked trends since the SEA
and the introduction of the "polluter pays" principle is the Community's
use of economic and fiscal instruments.
ECONOMIC AND FISCAL INSTRUMENTS
The shift toward the use of economic and fiscal incentives to en-
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courage industry to behave in an environmentally friendly way was
agreed upon by EC environment ministers in late 1990. Economic in-
struments are "instruments that affect costs and benefits of alternative
actions open to economic agents, with the effect of influencing behavior
in a way which is favorable to the environment." In other words, they
are instruments affecting the costs of a firm in such a way as to promote
the use of processes and products which are less damaging to the
environment.
The Directive presently being drafted by the Commission on CO2
Taxes is a typical example of a measure which uses a financial instrument
to induce compliance. The purpose of the Draft CO2 Tax Directive is to
stabilize EC carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000. As
presently drafted, the Directive would require that energy taxes be raised
in equal (50/50) proportions from two sources: as a levy on all energy
sources except renewables and as a charge on the carbon content of en-
ergy. The tax basis is to be a ten dollar surcharge per barrel of oil, ap-
plied in stages. Taxation of other energy sources is to be based on their
energy equivalency to one barrel of oil. Temporary exemptions from the
carbon dioxide tax would exist for energy-intensive sectors such as steel,
chemicals, cement and packaging.
The CO2 Tax Proposal has competitive implications for companies
in Canada and the U.S. If the U.S. fails to sign the Treaty on Global
Warming, U.S. companies will be at a competitive advantage over their
EC counterparts. At present, the chances of the U.S. signing such a
Treaty or enacting an energy tax seem very remote. Therefore, the effect
of the EC tax would be to unilaterally raise the cost of EC exports, and
thereby blunt the competitiveness of Community companies in world
markets.
On the other hand, some non-EC countries have also complained
that an EC energy tax would create a kind of invisible trade barrier, by
adding to the entry costs for non-EC businesses seeking to set up produc-
tion plants within the EC. However, this barrier is likely to be less of a
barrier to U.S. companies than it would be to Third World and other
countries that have not adjusted their technologies to the rigors of a
highly taxed market.
There are many conflicting pressures being brought to bear on the
content of the EC CO2 tax, such that prospects for it are far from clear.
However, what is clear is that it is an indication of the Commission's
willingness to use ambitious fiscal measures in the EC to influence envi-
ronmental behavior. It is a clear indication of the Community's resolve
to make the polluter pay.
Another slightly less contentious, but nonetheless controversial
measure which provides for the use of financial incentives is the draft EC
directive on packaging. This Draft Packaging Directive is about to be
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The aim of the Draft Packaging Directive is to bring into line differ-
ent national schemes for combatting the EC's ever-growing mountains of
discarded packaging. The Draft Packaging Directive would require
Member States to implement measures which would mandate that ninety
percent of packaging waste should be "recovered" (i.e., reused, recycled
into new products, burned to produce energy or turned into compost)
within ten years of the Directive's entry into force. At least sixty percent
would have to be reused or recycled within the same time frame. Pack-
aging for which return and subsequent reuse or recovery channels are not
established would be banned no later than five years after the Directive's
entry into force; this is likely to be around the year 2000. "Packaging" is
described very widely in the Draft as "all material of any nature so
processed as to be used for the containment, the handling and the deliv-
ery of any product, from raw materials to processed goods, from the pro-
ducer to the user or the consumer." The Draft requires the Member
States to enact "economic instruments" to promote the prevention of
packaging waste, including the establishment of funds necessary to run
recycling centers.
This Directive will clearly have cost implications for virtually every
industry seeking to place its products on EC markets. For the packaging
industry, the Directive has obvious economic consequences, as it will re-
sult in a minimization of packaging and a requirement that the packaging
industry modify its processes so as to produce more recycl-
able/recoverable packaging.
For U.S. companies established within the EC, the cost implications
of this Directive will be no different than the cost implications for indus-
tries in the EC of European parentage. However, U.S. exporters sending
packed goods to the EC will have to adapt their packaging to EC stan-
dards to assure trouble-free circulation with the EC.
The EC Directive was partly inspired by a similar national packag-
ing law introduced in Germany. The experience of the U.S. computer
company Hewlett-Packard provides an example of the effects of that law.
In order to comply with the German packaging law, Hewlett-Packard
redesigned its packaging worldwide to make it easier to recycle in Ger-
many. Similarly, so as to satisfy the requirements of the Directive once it
is in place, many exporters of goods to the EC believe that they will be
obliged to incur the cost of having their products packaged by EC
contractors.
INFLUENCING BEHAVIOR AND PRODUCT STRATEGY
The purpose of the use of economic and fiscal measures in EC envi-
ronmental legislation is to influence the motives and behavior of produ-
cers and consumers so as to discourage processes and products that cause
waste and pollution. The EC Commission recently proposed many
measures which do not contain express fiscal incentives, but which none-
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theless seek to encourage companies to produce "green" products and
employ "green" processes. These non-fiscal measures contain elements
which sensitize company behavior to environmental pressures and make
manufacturers responsible for the environmental impact of their
products.
An example of such non-fiscal measures is a directive which the Eu-
ropean Commission is said to be drafting concerning electronic goods.
This measure would require makers and sellers of electronic equipment
to take back their products and similar products made by other manufac-
turers for the purpose of recycling them. Such a measure would require
manufacturers to evaluate the environmental effects of a product right
from the design stage of that product.
Further evidence of environmental legislation reaching into the
realm of product design is found in a recently proposed EC regulation on
eco-labelling. The aim of the proposed Eco-Labelling Regulation is to
promote the design, production, marketing and use of products having a
minimum impact on the environment for their entire life-cycle and to
inform consumers of the existence of such products.
In order for their products to bear the eco-label, manufacturers or
importers would have to apply to the competent authority designated by
the Member State in which the product is either manufactured, first put
on the market or imported. The award of the eco-label will be decided
after assessment of the ecological performance of the products, judged by
general principles set down in the proposed Regulation and by the spe-
cific criteria designed for categories of products.
The eco-label scheme would be an entirely voluntary scheme. It is
anticipated that market forces will be sufficient to promote it. The costs
of the scheme to industry will not just be the payment of fees for the
ongoing use of the eco-label, but will also reflect the need for research
and development, retooling, retraining, finding new sources of supply
and promoting products with eco-labels. Indications are that companies
are keen to be in a position to use the eco-label; a recent survey of EC
management attitudes to environmental issues revealed, for example,
that seventy-five percent of German companies and ninety percent of
Danish companies stated that they had altered or planned to alter their
products to meet consumer demands for environmental friendliness.
While the "green" buying policies fostered by the eco-labelling scheme
will involve costs for many companies, the fact is that for those who can
supply goods and services that are environmentally sound, important
new opportunities are also being created.
A further example of legislation by which the EC is seeking to
"cash-in" on the existing market pressure on companies to comply with
environmental demands is the proposed EC Regulation on Environmen-
tal Auditing. The objective of the environmental auditing scheme would
be to promote the use of environmental auditing as a tool for systematic
and periodic evaluation of environmental performance of industrial ac-
Vol. 18:89 1992
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tivities. Like the eco-labelling scheme, participation would be voluntary.
The EC Commission hopes that the scheme will be attractive to compa-
nies in that it will improve their status and environmental credibility in
the eyes of the public, shareholders and authorities.
The costs of the environmental auditing scheme to companies would
be those of carrying out the initial audit itself and having that initial
audit verified by an external, independent auditor. Costs will be less sig-
nificant for companies which are already carrying out environmental au-
dits on a voluntary basis.
Participation in voluntary measures such as eco-labelling and eco-
auditing is likely to increase. The readiness of many companies to absorb
the associated costs seems to be motivated by the belief that their entire
commercial success is tied largely to a sound environmental control
policy.
INTEGRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION INTO OTHER
COMMUNITY POLICIES
The SEA provided that environmental requirements should be a
component of other EC policies. There is growing evidence of the EC
Commission's response to this provision by attempting to integrate an
environmental dimension into other Community policies. The EC Com-
mission, for example, has recently announced that in the future it intends
to pay close attention to the environment when granting EC economic
development funds to the EC's poorer regions, and the EC Commission
has claimed that generally it intends to adopt policies which put environ-
mental consensus on equal footing with economic aims.
A further example was a recent Commission Decision on state-aid.
The EC Treaty prohibits the granting of state-aids by Member States if
their effect is to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or
goods. In a review of proposed aid by the Belgian Government (consist-
ing of a capital grant of US $3.8 million and a three year property tax
exemption) to a large Belgian chemical company, the EC Commission
said that the aid had a valid environmental purpose which outweighed
any adverse effects on competition. This Decision is particularly signifi-
cant, as it comes at a time when the EC Commission is generally taking a
very dim and stringent view on state-aids.
The integration of Community environment policy with other
sectoral policies of the Community is a growing trend and will require
industry to make adaptations with inevitable cost implications.
THE "POLLUTER PAYS" PRINCIPLE AND EC WASTE POLICY
Even clearer espousal of the EC's "polluter pays" policy is found in
recent EC legislation concerning waste. Waste policy is one of the envi-
ronmental areas in which the EC has been most active. Rapidly dwin-
dling - and, in some areas, totally insufficient - waste disposal capacity
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on the crowded European continent has caused something of a crisis at-
mosphere in the EC. In 1990, the Community agreed on a strategy for
waste management. This waste management strategy was based on the
principles of prevention, recycling and reuse, restoration of contaminated
sites, EC self-sufficiency in waste management and the proximity princi-
ple. New legislative measures relating to waste reflect the principles con-
tained in the 1990 Waste Management Strategy. Taken together, these
initiatives will substantially increase the costs of waste management in
the EC. Three direct legislative initiatives in the context of waste man-
agement are examined below.
Framework Legislation on Waste
The Community has recently amended its basic legislation on waste.
The recently adopted EC Directive 91/156 provides for a harmonized
EC definition of "waste". Prior to the adoption of Directive 91/156,
waste was basically defined in accordance with the provisions of national
law. The absence of a harmonized EC definition of waste led, in the EC
Commission's view, to the distortion of competition between producers
and disposers of waste and to trade barriers in the EC.
Directive 91/156 amends the existing EC legislation on wastes and
defines waste with reference to a list of categories of waste set out in an
Annex to the Directive. The EC Commission is presently preparing a list
of specific wastes belonging to these categories before the Directive enters
into force. The Directive reinforces certain priorities: the prevention or
reduction of waste, recovery by recycling, reuse or reclamation, and use
as an energy source. Under the Directive, the disposal of waste will be
highly controlled; uncontrolled disposal is prohibited, and disposal oper-
ations will be subject to permits. Recycling operations will have to be
permitted. The Directive also lays the ground for the application of the
"proximity principle" by providing for the establishment of an integrated
network of waste disposal installations in order to make EC Member
States self-sufficient in waste disposal.
In addition to Directive 91/156, the Community has also recently
amended its legislation on hazardous waste (Directive 91/689). The
Hazardous Waste Directive provides for a very broad definition of "haz-
ardous waste" by means of reference to three Annexes. The EC Com-
mission is also drafting lists of the specific types of hazardous wastes
which belong to the various Annex categories.
Basically, the Hazardous Waste Directive broadens the definition of
"hazardous waste" tremendously. For example, the new definition will
cover listed wastes and wastes that contain specified substances unless it
can be proven that the wastes are not explosive, oxiding, highly flamma-
ble, flammable, irritating, harmful, toxic, carcinogenic, corrosive, infec-
tious, teratogenic, mutagenic, able to release toxic gases, leachable or
exotoxic. Any waste which exhibits any of those properties is to be clas-
Vol. 18:89 1992
6
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 18 [1992], Iss. , Art. 12
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol18/iss/12
Hartnett-EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
sified as a hazardous waste. Given the difficulty of providing that any
waste may not, for example, be "flammable", an extremely wide range of
wastes would appear to qualify as hazardous wastes under this new
definition.
The Hazardous Waste Directive bans the uncontrolled disposal of
hazardous waste as well as the mixing of wastes unless such mixing is
necessary for recycling. It further requires Member States to inspect
waste producing facilities on a regular basis. Finally, in accordance with
the "polluter pays" principle, the Hazardous Waste Directive places the
cost of disposal of hazardous waste on the waste producer and any other
holders that consign the waste for disposal.
The cost implications of these new Waste Directives are evident.
While adoption of harmonized definitions of "waste" removes some un-
certainties associated with often-conflicting national definitions, the defi-
nitions contained in the new Directives are far from crystal-clear. In
many cases, the definitions are very broad; their breadth and complexity
is likely to increase compliance costs for industry.
Proposed Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Waste
Implementation of the "polluter pays" principle is further evidenced
in a proposed EC Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by
Waste. This proposal would introduce strict liability for two kinds of
damage:
" damage to the environment resulting from death or physical in-
jury, or damage to property; and
" "impairment" of the environment, which means any significant
physical, chemical or biological deterioration of the environment
insofar as this is not considered to be damage to property.
The principal target of the Directive is the "producer" of waste (i.e.,
the person who, in the course of a commercial or industrial activity, pro-
duces waste and/or who, by preprocessing, mixing or other means,
changes the nature or composition of waste). Apart from the original
producer, three other types of persons may be "deemed" to be producers:
the person importing the waste into the EC; the person who had "actual
control" of the waste when the incident giving rise to damage occurred;
and the person responsible for the establishment to which the waste was
lawfully transferred.
Under this Directive, fault on the part of the producer does not have
to be proved; in other words, the Directive imposes a system of strict
liability. Liability is both joint and several. The Directive does not apply
to damage from an "incident" occurring before the date on which the
Directive comes into force. However, "incident" is not defined in the
Directive, and there is some legal uncertainty as to whether gradual pol-
lution could constitute an "incident" (e.g., the case of post-directive
leaching from a pre-directive deposit).
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The remedies available to plaintiffs are to be determined by national
laws. They must, however, include an injunction prohibiting the act
causing damage and an injunction ordering the reinstatement of the envi-
ronment and/or ordering the execution of preventative measures and the
reimbursement of costs lawfully incurred in reinstating the environment.
The introduction of strict civil liability by this Directive is clearly
intended to provide all polluters with additional incentives to carry out
their activities with a greater degree of care. This has serious financial
implications for industry.
The cost implications for industry are also heightened by the fact
that the proposal provides that liability under the Directive must be cov-
ered by either insurance or other financial security. Given the unclarity
of the nature and scope of the liability to be imposed by the Directive, as
well as the fact that the proposal does not provide for a ceiling on the
producer's liability, it is questionable whether insurance will even be
available from commercial insurance companies to cover such liability.
The proposal does not address this question. Even if such insurance is
available, it is likely to be very expensive and, therefore, is likely to im-
pose a severe financial burden on industry, which small industries may in
particular find very burdensome.
Further costs may be incurred by industry as a result of the defini-
tion of "producer" under the Directive. The fact that the producer may
be deemed to be the person who had "actual" control of the waste when
the damage occurred may have implications for banks. Although it is
unclear whether a lending bank could be claimed to have "actual" con-
trol of the waste and, therefore, count as a "producer", the strictness of
the proposed liability has sent tremors through bankers' ranks. Their
fear is triggered by a notorious court case two years ago in the U.S. in-
volving a company called Fleet Factors, which set a broad precedent for
bank liability for clean-up costs. The court ruled that banks must pay if
they participate "in the financial management of a facility to a degree
indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazard-
ous wastes." The court also ruled that a bank did not have to exercise
that capacity to be liable.
It is unclear if and in what way the EC Commission will address the
issue of liability so as to define precise borders for liability under this
Directive and more generally under EC law. The EC Commission is
presently at the early stages of preparing a Green Paper on liability for
environmental damage. What is clear is that if the proposed Civil Liabil-
ity Directive is adopted in its present form, banks will closely scrutinize
all sensitive projects before making any loans. Most major banks have
indicated that they are likely to introduce procedures to check custom-
ers' environmental records before advancing loans and are likely to re-
main vigilant until loans are repaid. Many banks also have a related fear
in this context that the existence of a far-reaching system of strict civil
Vol. 18:89 1992
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liability may result in their customers being caught up in expensive envi-
ronmental law suits, which may impair their ability to repay loans.
All of these fears will result in higher costs for industry. Industry
will have to spend money providing banks with evidence of its green cre-
dentials, and its loans are likely to become more costly because of uncer-
tainty as to environmental liability. Similarly, satisfying financiers'
worries is likely to lead to lawyers' fees and delays in completing transac-
tions, both of which will add noticeably to costs.
Proposal for a Regulation on Transfrontier Shipment of Waste
The proposed Regulation on Transfrontier Shipment of Waste, once
adopted, would strictly regulate the shipment of all wastes within the
EC, and indeed between regions within the individual Member States.
This proposed Regulation is, in part, inspired by the EC's need to imple-
ment the 1989 Basel Convention (a Convention to which the U.S. is also
a party); it would, therefore, implement the 1989 Basel Convention with
respect to wastes exported from or into the EC as well as waste move-
ments within the EC. The proposed Regulation centers on the "proxim-
ity principle" and seeks to limit the long-distance transport of wastes and
encourage national self-sufficiency in waste management capacity. This
proposal will pervasively affect industrial operations within the EC that
generate, ship, recycle, reuse and reclaim, store, treat and ultimately dis-
pose of wastes.
The proximity principle would be implemented through a relatively
complex notification and consent regime. Each person planning to ship
any waste from one jurisdiction within the EC to another - including
shipments between regions within Member States where each region has
competence regarding regulation of waste - must notify the "competent
authority" of destination and send copies of this notification to the com-
petent authorities for the jurisdiction of dispatch and the competent au-
thorities of any regions or countries through which the waste will move
while in transit. This notification must furnish detailed information with
regard to the waste.
The notification procedure is likely to incur considerable costs for
industry; the Regulation provides that the costs of implementing the no-
tification and supervision procedures are to be charged to notifiers by the
Member States concerned. In any given case, three Member States may
be involved (i.e., states of dispatch, transit and destination), and each
may separately request costs. The proposed Regulation does not contain
any criteria of reasonableness or other limitation on the costs that may be
levied. Moreover, the notification system, in practice, is likely to be cum-
bersome and is likely to require extensive commitment of resources by
industrial companies.
The second cost aspect of the proposed Regulation is that notifiers
are required to provide "security" and/or "surety" with respect to each
9
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waste shipment. This surety will be required even when the shipment is
already covered by adequate insurance. Finally, the requirement that
waste be disposed of as near as possible to the place of creation will not
just mean that industry will no longer be able to shop around for the
cheapest and least regulated dump, but will also mean that large compa-
nies with their own disposal facilities may no longer be able to internalize
their waste disposal.
Overall Cost Implications of Emerging EC Waste Legislation
This sample of emerging EC waste legislation leads to one incontro-
vertible conclusion: in the future, there will be extreme pressure on EC
waste disposal facilities with an inevitable cost factor for those using EC
waste disposal facilities. In this respect, the Community is gradually har-
monizing standards for waste disposal facilities (e.g., proposed directives
on standards for landfills and hazardous waste incinerators). These di-
rectives take as their standard a high degree of environmental protection.
Therefore, waste disposal will not just be costly for industry in the EC
because of the inadequacy of existing facilities, but also because of the
high standards which those facilities, but also because of the high stan-
dards which those facilities will have to meet.
IMPACT OF OVERALL TRENDS ON INDUSTRY
In Europe, environmental pressure on industry and attendant costs
are clearly growing. As indicated, EC environmental legislation is in-
creasingly characterized by high environmental standards - the use of
economic and fiscal incentives to induce compliance and create "peer
group" pressure to comply with schemes which are theoretically volun-
tary. Accordingly, I see the main consequences for industry as follows:
" Industry will need to be increasingly vigilant about forthcoming
legislation and will seek to influence legislators (in particular the
EC Commission) at the earliest stages of the development of EC
legislation. This process does not need to be negative or con-
frontational; the European Commission is frequently grateful to
industry for scientific and technical input which will help it to
formulate realistic and sound standards to be incorporated into
legislation.
* Many companies are being required to change their organiza-
tional structure to cope with increasing environmental demands.
For example, some companies are setting up panels (often com-
posed of outsiders) to assess their environmental performance;
other companies are linking the pay of managers to performance
in meeting environmental targets, and some are going so far as to
appoint boardroom directors with special responsibility for the
environment.
* The broader interpretation of environmental liability emerging in
Vol. 18:89 1992
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the EC is causing investing institutions and insurance companies
to take even closer interest in companies' environmental records.
This scrutiny from financiers is generally making acquisitions and
disposals more difficult.
The trends identified in EC environmental legislation are likely, in
certain ways, to have a positive impact for U.S. companies. For example,
the fact that the EC is approximately five years behind the U.S. in envi-
ronmental implementation means that U.S. companies have generally in-
vested in creating structures to induce environmental compliance, while
EC companies are having to invest now and during recession. It should
also be of some consolation to U.S. industry to know that public and
private spending on environmental protection in the EC has not risen in
line with economic growth, with the exception of Germany and the
Netherlands.
Furthermore, the fact that a growing number of companies, both
European and U.S., are showing commitment to environment protection
is positive. The fact is that most companies are willing and able to ab-
sorb the costs of environmental compliance so long as their competitors
also bear them.
Finally, one of the most important aspects in this context for compa-
nies to remember is that while there are considerable costs involved in
environmental compliance, all companies, and particularly companies in
sensitive sectors, can gain long-term advantages by showing environmen-
tal responsibility. By having environmentally sound products and manu-
facturing processes, such companies will be able to maintain social
acceptability, which is a crucial factor for their long-term survival.
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